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UNIVERSITY of NOTRE DAME 
COLLEGE of ARTS and LETTERS 
NOTRE DAME PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEWS 
G. W. F. HEGEL, TRANS. W. WALLACE, A. V. MILLER, AND M. INWOOD, INTRO. AND COMMENTARY, 
MICHAEL INWOOD 
Philosophy of Mind 
G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, W. Wallace and A. V. Miller (trans.), Michael Inwood (introduction 
and commentary), Oxford University Press, 2007, 680pp., $160.00 (hbk), ISBN 019929951X. 
Reviewed by Sebastian Rand, Georgia State University 
Michael Inwood's major revision of the Wallace and Miller translation of Hegel's Philosophy of Mind is a 
welcome addition to the English-language Hegel library. It comes at a crucial moment, when Hegel is 
being reconsidered by many philosophers in the English-speaking world, and this particular Hegelian text 
ought to be -- and now can be -- central to that reconsideration. While there are some questionable 
choices made in the translation itself, it is a definite and significant step forward. Inwood has also added 
an extensive commentary (longer by a third than Hegel's own text) which is informative and often 
helpful. 
The Philosophy of Mind is the final part of Hegel's Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline. 
In the last century or so of Hegel scholarship, the Encyclopedia has played a relatively minor role, 
despite the fact that it lays out the mature form of Hegel's system as that system was taught by Hegel 
himself (he wrote the Encyclopedia as the basis for his lectures). It has been largely overshadowed by 
other texts: the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Science of Logic dominated 20th-century discussion of 
Hegel, while the Philosophy of Right has recently attracted a good deal of attention. 
The roots of this canonical situation can be found in the content of the Encyclopedia itself. It is divided 
into three parts: the Logic, the Philosophy of Nature, and the Philosophy of Mind. The first is essentially 
a short version of the material presented in great detail in the Science of Logic; the Encyclopedia 
Logic has thus played second fiddle to the Science of Logic. The Philosophy of Nature is normally taken 
to present a misguided attempt to deduce the laws and structure of nature from a priori principles; this 
part of Hegel's system has been widely (and wrongly) scorned since his death. 
The Philosophy of Mind itself is divided into three main parts: "Subjective Spirit," "Objective Spirit," and 
"Absolute Spirit." Much of the content of the latter two (ranging over political philosophy, ethics, 
aesthetics, philosophy of religion, and metaphilosophy) is developed in detail in the Philosophy of 
Right and in the posthumously published Lectures on Aesthetics, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, 
and Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Hence "Objective Spirit" and "Absolute Spirit" bear to those 
texts an analogous relationship to that which the Encyclopedia Logic bears to the Science of Logic -- the 
former give the skeletal presentation fleshed out by the latter. It can thus appear that much of the 
content of the Encyclopedia is superseded by other Hegelian texts. 
For those convinced that the Encyclopedia Logic, Philosophy of Nature, "Objective Spirit," and "Absolute 
Spirit" are so superseded (this reviewer is emphatically not one of them), there remains only "Subjective 
Spirit" as a possible object of interest in the Encyclopedia; but this portion of the Philosophy of 
Mind presents its own systematic difficulties. Here, in subsections on "Anthropology," 
"Phenomenology," and "Psychology," Hegel attempts to lay out the structure of subjectivity -- that is, 
those aspects of our objective experience and knowledge of the world that can be attributed to the 
"subject" having that experience and knowledge. Yet in doing so he appears to embrace just those 
Kantian distinctions and terms -- intuition, representation, imagination, etc. -- he is thought to have 
overthrown as a result of his critical engagement with Kant; the revolutionary young philosopher of 
the Phenomenology of Spirit, the philosopher of the Unhappy Consciousness and the Master/Slave 
Dialectic, appears to have reverted to a dry mix of Kantian terminology and Wolffian rationalism tinged 
with pantheistic mysticism as soon as he was offered an endowed chair. 
Inwood's new edition of the Philosophy of Mind should help dispel these prejudices. It offers many 
advantages over previously available editions, of which there were four: first, the original Wallace 
translation of Hegel's 1830 edition, published in 1894; second, the Wallace translation augmented by 
the additions or Zusätzecompiled by Hegel's first posthumous editors, translated by Miller, and 
published in 1971; third, a partial, facing-page translation covering only "Subjective Spirit," by Michael 
Petry in 1977; and fourth, a translation of the 1817 edition by Stephen Taubenek in 1990. Inwood's 
edition, billed as a revision of the Wallace/Miller edition of 1971, is in fact frequently more than just a 
revision. Some sections are revised more lightly than others, but many are revised enough to constitute 
new translations in their own right. 
A detailed, or even a casual, comparison between Inwood's and Miller's translations, shows clearly how 
far more accurate and usable Inwood's edition is. First, there is the issue of Hegel's phrasing: Inwood 
largely retains Hegel's periods, punctuation, and emphases, while Wallace often does not. Especially in 
the Encyclopedia, which has a relatively rigid formal structure on both the large and small scale, this is 
extremely important. Inwood also excises many insertions of Wallace's which are simply not in the Hegel 
at all. And perhaps most importantly, Inwood hews closer to Hegel's technical vocabulary. Just to take a 
few examples (these are all from §445, but are typical): "setzen" is rendered as "positing" in Inwood 
while it is rendered as "treating" by Wallace; Inwood has "formal" for "formelle" instead of Wallace's 
"nominal;" and where Wallace sprinkles his translation with things like "to realize" as renderings of 
"sein" and "werden," Inwood sticks with Hegel's uses of "to be" and "to become," thereby avoiding 
needless difficulties with the concepts of reality and actuality in Hegel. Likewise, Wallace sometimes 
renders "für sich" as "actual," complicating the story even further, whereas Inwood renders it as "for 
itself." One could note many other similar differences. 
The most important effect of such changes is that we now have an edition of the Philosophy of Mind in 
English that allows us to follow closely the twists and turns of Hegel's thought in relation to some of the 
central questions animating current Hegel scholarship, as well as many of the central questions making 
Hegel interesting to contemporary philosophers in both the analytic and continental traditions. What 
are we saying when we ascribe to someone a free will? What is the connection between our 
embodiedness and our mindedness? Must we, indeed can we, understand our embodiedness -- and 
perhaps also our mindedness -- only in natural-scientific terms? Is a purely descriptive philosophy of 
mind possible, or even desirable? To what extent is Hegel a Kantian, to what extent a "post-Kantian," 
and to what extent is he attempting to reanimate rationalist metaphysics? The Encyclopedia in general 
gets much of its importance from being the unified presentation of material that is indeed also 
presented in an isolated fashion elsewhere, and the Philosophy of Mind is the part of 
the Encyclopedia that includes the systematic answers to such questions. Without a clear view of, e.g., 
Hegel's understanding of "subjective spirit," its relation to what Kant called "practical philosophy" 
(subsumed by Hegel under "objective spirit"), and its relation to our status as natural beings, his answers 
to these questions simply cannot be understood; but such a clear view cannot be gained by means of 
the previously available translations of the Philosophy of Mind. Thus Inwood's edition is welcome and 
timely. 
That said, there are some curious choices made by Inwood in the translation as a whole -- choices which 
he does not clearly and forcefully justify. For instance, Inwood warns us in a footnote to his 
"Introduction" (p. xi note 8) that he will be translating the German "Verstand" as "intellect," though it is 
normally translated in the Idealist context as "understanding." He gives three reasons for this choice: 
first, the use of "intellect" for "Verstand" allows the use of "intellectual" for "verstandig," whereas, 
presumably, no such closely related adjective exists for "understanding;" second, Verstand for Hegel 
involves division and distinction, whereas "understanding" in English connotes agreement and 
sympathy; third, the Kantian (and hence Hegelian) distinction between Verstand and Vernunft is meant 
to mirror the medieval distinction between intellectus and ratio. 
Such are the advantages of "intellect" as a translation for "Verstand." Here are some of the 
disadvantages, none of which are mentioned by Inwood: we lose the connection with other good 
translations of Hegel, and with the standard translations of Kant, which consistently use 
"understanding" for "Verstand;" we lose the engagement between the German use of "Verstand" and 
the English use of "understanding" in Locke, Hume, and others, as well as related terms in other 
languages (e.g., Leibniz's "entendement"), all of which can plausibly be said to be in play in the Idealist 
context; we lose the specific impact of Hegel's use of "Intelligenz," since it no longer stands out for its 
rootedness in the Latin "intellectus;" and we lose the connection between "understanding" and the verb 
"to understand" (which Inwood does use for "verstehen," but also occasionally for "erkennen"). The 
disadvantages in this case appear to outweigh the advantages; it is unfortunate that Inwood does not 
address these issues directly. 
One other noteworthy translation decision, also signalled by Inwood in a footnote to his "Introduction" 
(p. xii note 9), is his choice to abandon the standard translation of "Dasein" as "determinate being." No 
doubt "determinate being" is awkward (though not more awkward than the "being-there" used by the 
most recent translation of the Encyclopedia Logic), and it is the fond dream of many a Hegel scholar to 
find a more suitable translation. Inwood's decision is to translate it ("generally," as he says) by "reality" 
or "embodiment." He justifies this decision in a somewhat elliptical fashion: first he points out, entirely 
correctly, that to have "Dasein" in Hegel's sense is to have "a definite character;" secondly, he claims 
that "Dasein" is usually contrasted with the term "concept." Why exactly these considerations provide 
justification for translating "Dasein" as "reality" or "embodiment" is not explicitly stated, but presumably 
there is some sense in which reality and concepts can be profitably contrasted. 
Whatever the advantages of such a translation of "Dasein" turn out to be, they will have to overcome at 
least the following disadvantages: first, "reality" itself already translates Hegel's "Realität," which is a 
technical term deployed in the Science of Logic (see the Remark to "Quality" in Volume 1, Book 1, 
Chapter 2), and which has a long and tortured history in Western philosophy and in German Idealism in 
particular (see, for instance, Kant on the ontological proof, as well as his use of the term "objective 
reality"). In Hegel's specific case, Realität is merely one version of Dasein, and thus using "reality" as a 
translation for "Dasein" obscures the extent to which "Dasein" does more work for Hegel than "Realität" 
can, in his view (it also leaves open the problem of how to contrast the two terms while preserving 
Inwood's translation choice). Second, Hegel has a term for "embodiment:" "Verkörperung," which is 
used precisely, though infrequently. Third, Inwood does not even consistently use "reality" to render 
"Dasein;" so we find him in §382 translating "Dasein" as "life," which, given the role of the notion of life 
and the organic in Hegel's philosophy, is highly problematic. It is troubling to see such major 
terminological changes made with such scant discussion, and it can tend to undermine one's confidence 
in the translation, despite its obvious superiority to the Wallace and Miller edition. 
From a scholarly point of view, there is one other unfortunate aspect of the text of the Philosophy of 
Mind as presented in this edition. During Hegel's lifetime, the entire Encyclopedia was published as a 
series of numbered sections. Each of those sections contained one or more main body paragraphs; 
many of them also came with another set of one or more paragraphs, marked as "Remarks" 
or Anmerkungen. Hegel himself set the Remarks off from the main body paragraphs by means of 
indentation, and this has generally been preserved in subsequent editions. In the first posthumous 
edition of the Encyclopedia, many sections also came with "Additions" or Zusätze compiled from various 
manuscripts and student notes (some of which are now missing) by Hegel's executors and editors; this 
was done to provide the Encyclopedia with a printed form of the oral elaboration Hegel always claimed 
it required. Given their far more questionable textual status, these Zusätze are now almost always 
printed in smaller typeface than the main text and Remarks, in order to make it clear to readers when 
they are dealing with "official" Hegelian text and when they are dealing with something else. 
Inwood's edition does away with both of these formatting conventions, and the result is a book with a 
deceptively uniform visual presentation, in which vital distinctions between sources, and hence the very 
nature of the texts in question, are obscured. Granted, the Remarks are marked as such with the word 
"Remark" in brackets, and the Zusätze with the word "Zusatz;" and granted, diligent readers can be 
expected to make the appropriate distinctions on their own. Inwood also indicates, briefly, the different 
status of theZusätze in the "Introduction." But why not simply follow the formatting conventions? This 
truly seems like a needless confusion, and it is one that could prove genuinely dangerous to readers who 
are not sufficiently aware of the interpretive issues at stake. 
Last but certainly not least, there is the extensive commentary in the form of endnotes. These notes 
actually take up substantially more space in the volume than Hegel's own text (385 pages for the notes; 
279 for Hegel's text). The notes tend to take on one or more of the following tasks: providing historical 
background to a term or claim; providing internal cross-reference to another part of the Encyclopedia, 
or to other Hegelian texts; providing reference to secondary literature; and providing interpretive 
reconstructions of arguments and/or conceptual distinctions. 
In performing the first three of these tasks, Inwood's notes do an admirable job; he is particularly 
thorough as regards cross-references. But it is performing the last task that counts as providing a 
commentary. Unfortunately, notes are not the best format in which to perform that task, since their 
interrupted structure presents an inherent obstacle to providing a unified, coherent interpretation. This 
is not to say that these notes will not be helpful to readers; I imagine they will be, particularly as readers 
strive to grasp some obscure Hegelian distinctions. Inwood is keen in his notes to isolate arguments and 
conceptual distinctions, and this can be very helpful indeed, even as it tends to underemphasize the 
plastic and synthetic aspect of Hegelian dialectic. 
Readers will, however, still be left to generate their own unified view of the text and the way it fits into 
the rest of the Hegelian corpus, or to assemble such a view from the notes. This is not a bad thing in 
itself. But it makes one wonder why Inwood and Oxford did not limit the notes to the historical, cross-
reference, and secondary reference tasks, and provide a unified commentary as a separate volume. That 
way the bulk of this volume (and presumably its price as well) would be reduced, and readers interested 
in having a detailed guide through the text could have one capable of providing a unified picture of the 
movement of Hegel's thought, instead of the necessarily fragmented and interrupted insights that can 
be brought across in a series of notes. The result would be particularly welcome given the scarcity of 
monographs on this text in English (and the relative dearth of such monographs even in German). 
Overall, then, this new edition of the Philosophy of Mind is welcome, while it leaves room for 
improvement. Since there appears to be a fair amount of activity in the world of Hegel translation these 
days, perhaps it will have some competition before too long. In the meantime, Inwood has provided a 
much-improved translation of an absolutely central text, along with a helpful set of notes that provide a 
fine starting-point for genuine historical and contemporary engagement with one of Hegel's most 
rewarding works. 
